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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Respondent disagrees with the statement of the Nature of the Case contains in Defendant's 
Appellant Brief only in so far as the scope of the Industrial Commission's decision below. The 
Industrial Commission awarded Claimant workers' compensation benefits for the fees of the 
Guardian and the Conservator previously appointed by the District Court to attend to the Claimant. 
Contrary to statement of the Appellant, the Industrial Commission did not award fees for the 
Guardian ad Litem and held that those were not compensable under Idaho Code§ 72-432 (1). 
Respondent contends that the ruling of the Industrial Commission below should be affirmed. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Respondents do not disagree with the recitation of the course of proceedings below. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. Respondent's Total and Permanent Disability is Profound 
While Appellant's Brief centers upon what the Appellant has done to take care of the 
Respondent since his devastating head injury, many of the details of the disability suffered by the 
Respondent have been overlooked. As developed in the Hearing testimony below, the Respondent's 
disabilities are profound and prevent him from making any real decision about his medical needs 
or his well being in general. 
As Appellant's Brief briefly alludes to, this case starts out with an injury to the Respondent, 
Josue Barrios, on January of 2014, when he fell 12 feet off a ladder striking his head on the concrete. 
Respondent was immediately taken by ambulance to St. Alphonsus Medical Center where he was 
evaluated and hospitalized with life threatening injuries. Respondent's initial admitting diagnosis 
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was as follows: 
1. Severe brain injury with bilateral frontal epidural hematomas and probable 
intracerebral contusions. 
2. Skull fractures. 
3. Facial fractures. 
4. Probable left carotid artery injury with occlusion and reconstruction. 
5. Posttraumatic respiratory failure. 
See AR, Defendants' Exhibit 2. The medical records demonstrate that after Respondent was 
evaluated diagnostically he was found to have several severe skull fractures with fragments of bone 
extending into the brain along with severe injury to the bones of the face. Neurosurgery was called 
and several operations took place. See AR, Defendants' Exhibit 2. 
After healing and stabilizing from his surgical procedures, Respondent was transferred to the 
Southwest Idaho Advance Care Hospital and their initial intake provides a useful summary of 
medical procedures which Respondent had endured. See AR, Defendants' Exhibit 2. While 
Respondent was in the Southwest Idaho Advance Care Hospital, Dr. Michael McMartin was brought 
into the case and became Respondent's treating physician. Dr. McMartin was active in the brain 
injury treatment program at St. Alphonsus Hospital and saw Respondent throughout this program 
on an extensive basis. It was Dr. McMartin that eventually communicated with the Respondent's 
Guardian and Guardian ad Litem in connection with the application for temporary guardianship. 
In May of 2014, Respondent was transferred from Southwest Idaho Advance Care Hospital 
to Ashley Manor, a long term care facility. The nursing staff and supervisors at Ashley Manor 
became concerned about Respondent's inability to care for himself and started the process for the 
appointment of a Guardian and Conservator to care for Respondent and manage his affairs, both 
medically and financially. See Tr., 14-15. 
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Initial contact was made with Mr. Robert Aldridge, a Boise attorney with extensive 
experience in conservator and guardianship matters. Mr. Aldridge testified at the Hearing in this 
matter, and described the process by which he initiated the appointment of the guardian and 
conservator on a temporary basis and the foundation necessary for those appointments. See Tr., page 
17. Mr. Aldridge testified that he made many contacts in this process including contacting family 
members, physicians, and working with conservators and guardians in the Boise area with whom he 
had long experience. Mr. Aldridge testified that following the appointment of the permanent 
conservator and guardian, he also became involved in helping Respondent move from one care 
facility to another. Mr. Aldridge explained that because Ashley Manor only had one person in the 
whole facility who spoke Spanish, Respondent became very isolated and frustrated and felt that he 
was unable to communicate with most of the people in that facility. Mr. Aldridge testified that he 
helped identify an alternative facility, and worked with the Guardian and the Conservator to obtain 
approval for Respondent to be moved to a certified family home in Caldwell where the owners both 
spoke Spanish. Mr. Aldridge testified that Respondent was doing much better and was much happier 
in this placement and testified that his services were appropriate about bringing about this transfer. 
See Tr., 24-26. 
Respondent's caregiver and attendant, Isabel Hernandez, testified extensively about the 
manner in which she provided care to the Respondent, and the care that is necessary because of his 
traumatic brain injury. First of all, Ms. Hernandez testified that as a Spanish speaking person, she 
is able to communicate effectively with Respondent and testified that Respondent would be lost 
without someone with whom he could speak Spanish. See Tr., page 116. 
In a summary fashion, Ms. Hernandez testified that Respondent is like a child in many ways. 
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Starting in the early morning, Ms. Hernandez testified that she goes into his room, she wakes him 
up, gets him up out of bed, reminds him to go to the bathroom to washup, reminds him to brush his 
teeth and fixes him breakfast. Ms. Hernandez testified that she has to cue Respondent and remind 
him daily of his daily hygienic routine, and that Respondent needs helps with the most basic hygienic 
requirements. See Tr., page 116-117. 
Ms. Hernandez testified that Respondent can dress himself but often picks the wrong clothes, 
and that she has to pick out his clothes and put them on the bed for him. See Tr., page 117-118. Ms. 
Hernandez testified that after the normal morning routine, the Respondent watches a lot of TV and 
that he needs constant help with the TV remote, even though it is a small basic unit. See Tr., page 
118-119. 
Ms. Hernandez testified that Respondent needs cuing and reminding to eat at lunch time. 
Respondent eats whatever is put in front of him. Ms. Hernandez testified that thankfully, 
Respondent is not a picky eater. See Tr., page 119-120. With regard to ongoing physical activities, 
Ms. Hernandez testified that the Respondent likes to walk and leave home to walk on his own but 
that she will not let him go without somebody in his presence. This frustrates the Respondent and 
makes him angry. Ms. Hernandez testified that sometimes Respondent talks to people he does not 
know, mistaking them for relatives, and gets lost easily. See Tr., page 120-121. 
Ms. Hernandez testified extensively about Respondent's ability to manage his own money, 
and indicates that she has to monitor how much cash Respondent has in his wallet at all times to 
prevent abuse. See Tr., page 121-122. Ms. Hernandez also testified that she goes with the 
Respondent to each and every one of his doctors appointments to make sure that Respondent 
discloses his health problems and symptoms. Ms. Hernandez testified that if left to his own 
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Respondent will tell all of the Doctors that he is just fine with no symptoms and that he does not 
appreciate the nature or the extent of his injury. See Tr., page 124-125. 
Significantly, Respondent complains on a daily basis about his right eye and the vision 
trouble which he has, and thinks that a operation will still be possible to replace his right sided 
vision. Ms. Hernandez testified that Respondent continues to harbor this belief even though 
Physicians have repeatedly told him that his right eye will never be replaced and that he will never 
have any vision in his right eye. See Tr., page 125-126. 
Ms. Hernandez also testified about Respondent's behavior immediately before the Hearing, 
and indicated that he had become very disruptive and aggressive towards visitors to her home and 
gave examples of interaction which Respondent had with Health and Welfare people who had come 
to her home to check on a routine basis. See Tr., page 128-129. 
On cross-examination, Ms. Hernandez testified that she routinely provided linens to 
Respondent as part of her service and routinely launders and takes care of those linens. See Tr., page 
132. Ms. Hernandez also testified that she assist the Respondent in obtaining personal care items 
such as soaps, shampoos, deodorant, shaving cream, and razors. She works with the Conservator in 
obtaining funding for those personal items. See Tr., page 132-133. Ms. Hernandez testified that she 
does cue Respondent so that he is able to take care of his personal needs and that if she did not cue 
him, she did not think that the Respondent would shave, wear deodorant, or brush his teeth at all. 
See Tr., page 133. 
Ms. Hernandez also testified that she prepares all of the Respondent's meals and makes sure 
that he takes his medications as scheduled. Ms. Hernandez testified that she keeps the medication 
in a locked safe, and routinely gives those medications to Respondent to make sure that he is 
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actually taking the medication as required. See Tr., page 133-135. Ms. Hernandez also testified that 
she launders all of Respondent's clothes and helps him pick out appropriate clothes depending on 
the weather. Ms. Hernandez testified emphatically that she would certainly allow Respondent behind 
the wheel of any car, and that she drives him everywhere. See Tr., page 135-136. 
2. Medical Care 
Immediately after Respondent's devastating head injury, the State Insurance Fund employed 
a Nurse to monitor and coordinate medical care to the Respondent, evidently recognizing that 
Respondent was not going to be able to make any medically related decisions on his own and needed 
someone to coordinate his medical care. This Nurse Case Manager coordinated Respondent's 
medical care and participated in Respondent's transfer from Ashley Manor, where he was originally 
placed after his acute medical care, to the care of Isabel Hernandez, the women who operates the 
certified family home in Caldwell where the Respondent resides at the current time. See Tr., page 
148-151. 
Respondent's treating physician or Dr. Michael McMartin, participated in this transfer and 
wrote a letter dated September 10, 2014 in part, as follows: 
"He (Respondent) also requires a guardian and conservator. 
The appointment of a guardian and of a conservator for Mr. Barrios 
is medically necessary due to the traumatic brain injury, which robs 
him of his ability to make cogent decisions about his medical 
treatment and about his financial affairs, and which requires the 
appointment of a guardian and of a conservator to make those 
decisions and to manage his financial affairs."See AR Defendants' 
Exhibit 8 page 74. 
One of the final medical examinations which Respondent underwent before reaching a point 
of medical stability, came from a psychologist. In preparation for this examination, the Defendant 
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adjuster, Donna Young, wrote a long letter to Dr. Gage asking his opinions about the extent of 
Respondent's disability. Specifically mirroring the language ofldaho Code§ 72-432 (3), the doctor 
was asked whether or not the Respondent had been rendered so helpless as to require the constant 
service of an attendant due to his industrial accident. The doctor replied in the affirmative, thereby 
requiring the State Insurance Fund to supply Respondent with the services of an attendant (Isabel 
Hernandez) under the terms of Idaho Code § 72-432 (3). 
This report, coupled with a letter from the State Insurance Fund Adjustor, Donna Young, 
demonstrates a summary of the Respondent's injuries and demonstrates that he is unable to care for 
himself, make any decisions about his medical care, living situation, finances, and needs the constant 
attendance of a personal care provider. See AR Claimant's Exhibit K. 
3. The Guardian 
The roles of the Guardian and the Conservator whose fees are at issue in this appeal, were 
explained at Hearing in detail. The Guardian, Drew Mayes, testified at Hearing and described his 
duties in some detail. Mr. Mayes summarized his role as one of a parent to a minor child. He testified 
that his job was to make sure that decisions are made for the Respondent which he can not make on 
his own. See Tr., page 54-55. Mr. Mayes testified that attends all of the Respondents medical 
appointments along with the personal care provider and is there as an advocate for Respondent, to 
make sure that the Doctor get a full history of how Respondent has been doing and his ongoing 
symptoms and complaints. See Tr., page 55-56. 
Mr. Mayes also testified that he makes visits to the personal care provider's home to make 
sure that the home is safe, clean, that Respondent is wearing appropriate clothes, and Respondent 
is not having any ongoing difficulties which require additional assistance. Mr. Mayes testified that 
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he makes these visits approximately once a month. See Tr., page 55-56. Mr. Mayes testifies that 
Isabel Hernandez, Respondent's personal care provider is very good at what she does and that his 
involvement has not been too extensive because of her comprehensive and thoughtful care. See Tr., 
page 57-58. 
Mr. Mayes also testified that he makes an annual report to the District Court of Ada County 
as required by statute. Mr. Mayes testified that this report hits the highlights of what he does on a 
day to day basis with Respondent. See Tr., page 58-59, see AR, Claimant's Exhibit J. 
Mr. Mayes also testified to the visits he made with Respondent to various stores to enable 
Respondent to buy clothes, personal items, postage, and even some shampoo. See Tr., page 59-60. 
Mr. Mayes also testified that as part of his job, he is required to prepare prospective care plans. See 
AR Claimant's Exhibit I. Mr. Mayes testified that Respondent has very poor insight and is someone 
who could be taken advantage of easily. Mr. Mayes testified that he has seen this happen with 
Respondent as it relates to efforts by one of his brothers to take over care and settle his workers' 
compensation case. Mr. Mayes, the Guardian, testified that he interceded with Respondent to make 
sure that none of this happened. See Tr., page 65-66. 
Mr. Mayes also testified that he meets the Respondent at appointments with other non-work 
related medical providers such as a Nurse Practitioner in Caldwell and a Dentist, and coordinates 
with these providers and the Conservator to make sure that Respondent's non-work related medical 
care is provided adequately and timely. See Tr., page 67-68. Mr. Mayes even testified that he had 
become aware that the Respondent likes late night sweets as a snack and testified that as the 
Guardian, he worried that this would cause Respondent's blood sugar to become too high leading 
to further medical problems Mr. Mayes testified that he had worked with the primary care provider 
8 
Ms. Hernandez about this in order to prevent any long term difficulties. See Tr., page 69-70. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Mayes testified that the statutory frame work under which he is 
employed enables him to consent on Respondent's behalf for medical care that would may be 
necessary for Respondent, and is empowered to act on Respondent's behalf to ensure that he obtains 
appropriate medical care. See Tr., page 71. Mr. Mayes also testified that he has the power to direct 
the Respondent's hobbies and leisure times activities in an effort to protect Respondent. Mr. Mayes 
testified that he would not allow Respondent in a boxing ring to trade blows with anyone even 
though the Respondent may wish to do so, nor would he allow the Respondent to go ten speed bike 
racing, or down hill ski racing. Mr. Mayes testified that he has input on the kinds of activities 
Respondent engages in. Mr. Mayes testified that by working with his primary care provider, Isabel 
Hernandez, he has the power to say no to activities which he deems are too dangerous for the 
Respondent. See Tr., page 82-83. 
4. The Conservator 
The Conservator, Paul Seidman, testified the he works for Tresca ofldaho, a company which 
he described as a professional fiduciary corporation which manages estates and court appointed 
Conservatorships. See Tr., page 84-85. As Conservator, Mr. Seidman testified that he is in the 
position of responsibility for overseeing the financial affairs of the Respondent, paying his bills, 
compromising expenses, and accounting to the Court on an annual basis for all these activities. See 
Tr., page 85. 
Mr. Seidman testified that he's responsibility is to manage Respondent's funds in his own 
best interests and that he has received the Respondent's workers' compensation benefits and paid 
out those monies accordingly. See AR Claimant's Exhibit G. 
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Mr. Seidman testified that all of the Respondent's assets in this matter have come from the 
State Insurance Fund on account of his workers' compensation claim except for a small income tax 
refund from the Tax Commission. See Tr., page 88. 
Mr. Seidman testified that he spent this money on medical expenses which were not covered 
by workers' compensation, for personal allowances to the Respondent, and for payments to 
professional providers such as the Conservator, Guardian, and Attorneys' fees. See Tr., page 89. Mr. 
Seidman testified extensively about the manner in which he has protected the Respondent from 
wasting his own money, and testified that Respondent is not capable of making sound judgements 
as to the use of his own money. Accordingly, Mr. Seidman has put the Respondent on a debit card 
system where he is allowed so much money per month and this the manner in which he monitors the 
expenditures of the Respondent. See Tr., 90-91. 
Mr. Seidman testified that he works carefully with the personal care provider, Isabel 
Hernandez, and that if the Respondent had some idea of spending a lot of money on something that 
he really didn't need, he would work with Ms. Hernandez in trying to discourage that as best as he 
could. See Tr., page 90-91. Mr. Seidman also testified that had checked with state and other federal 
agencies to see if Respondent had access to any other state or federal programs, and found that he 
was not qualified for Social Security benefits or for Medicare benefits of any kind. Nor was the 
Respondent qualified for any State of Idaho Medicaid benefits. See Tr., page 92. 
Accordingly, Mr. Seidman testified that he was quite concerned that if Respondent ever 
suffers from some other medical problem which is not covered by workers' compensation insurance, 
there will not be sufficient funding available to meet these needs. See Tr., page 93. Mr. Seidman also 
testified that he has not been able to pay all of the bills submitted to him because of insufficient 
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funding. He has had to compromise some bills in order to make some payments although he was not 
able to pay the entire balance. See Tr., page 94-95, see also page 103-105. 
Mr. Seidman testified that in August or Early September 2014, he became aware that the 
State Insurance Fund was finally going to begin paying benefits to Respondent herein, and testified 
that he received the first check payable to the Respondent in September 2014, despite the fact that 
Respondent's injury occurred on January 17, 2014. See AR Defendants' Exhibit 2. Mr. Seidman 
also testified that he had been informed in the Fall of 2014, that the State Insurance Fund had denied 
paying any of the fees for the Guardian or Conservator and based upon this denial, he undertook to 
ration out and compromise some of the fees which had been presented to him as a Conservator of 
Respondent's estate. See Tr., page 108-109. Finally, Mr. Seidman testified that despite a thorough 
search, he had not been able to find any other assets that the Respondent owned at the time of his 
accident that would enable him to further pay medical bills. He looked for anything he could such 
as houses, cars, motorcycles, snowmobiles, etc. Mr. Seidman had testified that he had not been able 
to find anything like that and that the only asset which Respondent had in this matter was his 
ongoing workers' compensation benefits. See Tr., page 108-109. 
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II. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the Industrial Commission err in holding the services provided to Respondent by 
Guardian and Conservator were compensable workers' compensation benefits under Idaho Code 
§ 72-432. 
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant have indicated in their brief that the facts of this matter are not in dispute and that 
this Court should therefor have exercise free review over any questions of law arising from the 
application of those facts. Many of the facts set forth in Respondent's Brief, above, have not been 
cited to by Defendants nor acknowledged as being without depute. Appellant's recitation of the facts 
have been very short and omits many of the facts pertaining to this appeal. 
A. Substantial and Competent Evidence 
Should the Appellant's dispute any of the factual matters set forth by Respondent, above, 
Respondent requests that this Court defer to the Findings of the Industrial Commission as long as 
substantial and confident evidence appears to support their factual findings. As this Court well 
knows, the power of this Court to reexamine factual determinations of the Industrial Commission 
below is limited and must focus on whether or not the factual findings below are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P. 3d 
85 (2009); Millard v. ABCO Construction Company, Inc., Idaho __ , __ P. 3d __ (2016). 
B. Free Review of Legal Conclusions 
Should the Appellant not dispute any of the factual matters set forth by Respondent, 
above, then the Court exercises free review of any legal conclusions drawn from those facts. See 
Maravilla v. J.R. Simplot Co. Company __ P.3d __ 2016 WL7488385, November 30, 2016. 
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See also Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 360 P. 3d 333 (2015). 
C. Liberal Construction of Workers' Compensation Act 
For almost 100 years, this Court has held that the legal provisions of the Idaho Code 
governing workers' compensation matters are to be liberally construed in favor of a injured Claimant 
with a view to effect it's object and promote justice to the injured worker. See Idaho Code§ 72-201, 
McNeil v. Pan Handle Lumber Co. 34 Idaho 773,203 P.1068 (1921), Smith v. University of Idaho, 
67 Idaho 22, 170 P. 2d 404 (1946), Frisk v. Garrett Fright Lines, Inc., 76 Idaho 27, 276 P. 2d 964 
(1954), Haldiman v. American True Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 793 P. 2d 187 (1990), Ogden v. 
Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P. 2d, 759 (1990). 
The intention of the Legislature in enacting the workers' compensation law was to provide 
sure and certain relief for injured workers and their dependents. This leaves no room for narrow and 
hyper-technical interpretation of the language involved. It is clear that the workers' compensation 
act is to be given a broad and liberal construction and doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of 
compensation because the humane purposes of the law leave no room for a hyper-technical 
construction. Smith v. University of Idaho, 66 Idaho 22, 170 P. 2d 404 (1946). 
IV. LEGAL PRINCIPALS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to Legislative intent. See 
Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc. 160 Idaho 223,226, 370 P. 3d 738, 741 (2016) See also Robinson v. 
Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207,210, 76 P. 3d 951,954, (2003). Because the best guide to Legislative 
intent is the words of the statue its self, the interpretation of a statue must be begin with the literal 
words of the statue. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819,824,828 P. 2d 848,853 (1992). In 
construing statue, the plain obvious and rational meaning is always to be preferred to any curious, 
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narrow, or hidden sense. Nagel v. Hammond 90 Idaho 96,408 P. 2d 648 (1965). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Statute at the Heart of the Dispute in this Matter is Idaho Code § 72-432 
For completeness sake, that entire statue is reproduced herein: 
"72-432. MEDICAL SERVICES, APPLIANCES AND SUPPLIES - REPORTS. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 72-706, Idaho Code, the employer 
shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical, surgical or other 
attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital services, medicines, crutches and 
apparatus, as may be reasonably required by the employee's physician or needed 
immediately after an injury or manifestation of an occupational disease, and for a 
reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured 
employee may do so at the expense of the employer. 
(2) The employer shall also furnish necessary replacements or repairs of 
appliances and prostheses, unless the need therefor is due to lack of proper care by 
the employee. If the appliance or prosthesis is damaged or destroyed in an industrial 
accident, the employer, for whom the employee was working at the time of accident, 
will be liable for replacement or repair, but not for any subsequent replacement or 
repair not directly resulting from the accident. 
(3) In addition to the income benefits otherwise payable, the employee who 
is entitled to income benefits shall be paid an additional sum in an amount as may be 
determined by the commission as by it deemed necessary, as a medical service, when 
the constant service of an attendant is necessary by reason of total blindness of the 
employee or the loss of both hands or both feet or the loss of use thereof, or by reason 
of being paralyzed and unable to walk, or by reason of other disability resulting from 
the injury or disease actually rendering him so helpless as to require constant 
attendance. The commission shall have authority to determine the necessity, character 
and sufficiency of any medical services furnished or to be furnished and shall have 
authority to order a change of physician, hospital or rehabilitation facility when in its 
judgment such change is desirable or necessary. 
( 4) ( a) The employee upon reasonable grounds, may petition the commission 
for a change of physician to be provided by the employer; however, the employee 
must give written notice to the employer or surety of the employee's request for a 
change of physicians to afford the employer the opportunity to fulfill its obligations 
under this section. If proper notice is not given, the employer shall not be obligated 
to pay for the services obtained. Nothing in this section shall limit the attending 
physician from arranging for consultation, referral or specialized care without 
permission of the employer. Upon receiving such written notice, the employer shall 
render its written decision on the claimant's request within fourteen (14) days. If any 
dispute arises over the issue of a request for change of physician, the industrial 
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commission shall conduct an expedited hearing to determine whether or not the 
request for change of physician should be granted, and shall render a decision within 
fourteen ( 14) days after the filing of the response by the employer. 
(b) The industrial commission shall, no later than December 31, 1997, 
promulgate a rule for the expeditious handling of a petition for change of physician 
pursuant to this section. Nothing herein shall prevent the commission from making 
periodic amendments, as may become necessary, to any rule for a petition for change 
of physician. 
(5) Any employee who seeks medical care in a manner not provided for in 
this section, or as ordered by the industrial commission pursuant to this section, shall 
not be entitled to reimbursement for costs of such care. 
(6) No provider shall engage in balance billing as defined in section 72-102, 
Idaho Code. 
(7) An employee shall not be responsible for charges of physicians, hospitals 
or other providers of medical services to whom he has been referred for treatment of 
his injury or occupational disease by an employer designated physician or by the 
commission, except for charges for personal items or extended services which the 
employee has requested for his convenience and which are not required for treatment 
of his injury or occupational disease. 
(8) The employer or surety shall not be subject to tort liability to any health 
care provider for complying with the provisions of this law. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require a workman who in 
good faith relies on Christian Science treatment by a duly accredited Christian 
Science practitioner to undergo any medical or surgical treatment, providing that 
neither he nor his dependents shall be entitled to income benefits of any kind beyond 
those reasonably expected to have been paid had he undergone medical or surgical 
treatment, and the employer or insurance carrier may pay for such spiritual treatment. 
( 10) The commission shall promulgate rules requiring physicians and other 
practitioners providing treatment to make regular reports to the commission 
containing such information as may be required by the commission. The commission 
shall promulgate such rules with the counsel, advice, cooperation and expertise of 
representatives of industry, labor, sureties and the legal and medical professions as 
well as institutions, hospitals and clinics having physical rehabilitation facilities. 
( 11) All medical information relevant to or bearing upon a particular injury 
or occupational disease shall be provided to the employer, surety, manager of the 
industrial special indemnity fund, or their attorneys or authorized representatives, the 
claimant, the claimant's attorneys or authorized representatives, or the commission 
without liability on the part of the physician, hospital or other provider of medical 
services and information developed in connection with treatment or examination for 
an injury or disease for which compensation is sought shall not be privileged 
communication. When a physician or hospital willfully fails to make a report required 
under this section, after written notice by the commission that such report is due, the 
commission may order forfeiture of all or part of payments due for services rendered 
in connection with the particular case. An attorney representing the employer, surety, 
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claimant or industrial special indemnity fund shall have the right to confer with any 
health care provider without the presence of the opposing attorney, representative or 
party, except for a health care provider who is retained only as an expert witness. 
(12) Physicians or others providing services under this section shall assist in 
the rehabilitation program provided in section 72-501A, Idaho Code. They shall 
cooperate with specialists from the commission's rehabilitation staff and with 
employer rehabilitation personnel in furthering the physical or vocational 
rehabilitation of the employee. The extension of total temporary disability benefits 
during retraining as authorized by section 72-450, Idaho Code, shall be the 
responsibility of the commission; however, the physician shall inform the 
commission as soon as it is medically apparent that the employee may be unable to 
return to the job in which he sustained injury or occupational disease following 
treatment and maximum recovery. 
(13) An injured employee shall be reimbursed for his expenses of necessary 
travel in obtaining medical care under this section. Reimbursement for transportation 
expenses, if the employee utilizes a private vehicle, shall be at the mileage rate 
allowed by the state board of examiners for state employees; provided however, that 
the employee shall not be reimbursed for the first fifteen ( 15) miles of any round trip, 
nor for traveling any round trip of fifteen (15) miles or less. Such distance shall be 
calculated by the shortest practical route of travel. 
( 14) An employee who leaves the locality where employed at the time of the 
industrial accident, or manifestation of an occupational disease, or the locality in 
which the employee is currently receiving medical treatment for the injury, shall give 
timely notice to the employer and surety of the employee's leaving the locality. The 
employer or surety may require the claimant to report to the treating physician for 
examination prior to leaving the locality, if practical. If an examination by the treating 
physician is not practical prior to leaving the locality, the employer or surety may 
assist in arranging an examination by an appropriate physician in the new locality. 
After receiving notice of relocation, the employer or surety shall have the same 
responsibility to furnish care as set forth in subsection ( 1) of this section." 
The portion of this statue with which the parties have a dispute comes in subsection 1 as 
follows: 
" ... the Employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical, 
surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital services, medicines, 
crutches, and apparatus, as may be reasonably required by the employee's physician or 
needed immediately after an injury ... " 
Initially, therefore, its appears that the medical care or attendance at issue must be reasonably 
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required by the employee's physician. 
B. Services Provided by Respondent's Guardian and Conservator are Medically 
Necessary. 
As noted above, the Respondent's requirement for a Conservator and a Guardian have been 
deemed medically necessary by the Respondent's treating physician, Dr. Michael McMartin. In 
September, 2014, Dr. McMartin penned which, in part, reads as follows; 
"He also requires a Guardian and Conservator. The appointment of a Guardian 
and of a Conservator for Mr. Barrios is medically necessary due to the traumatic brain 
injury, which robs him of his ability to make cogent decisions about his medical 
treatment and about his financial affairs, and which require the appointment of a 
Guardian and of a Conservator to make those decisions and manage his financial 
affairs." 
See AR, Defendant's Exhibit 8 page 74. As set forth in the factual record above, there are 
many reasons for this medical opinion all of which support the medical necessity of the Respondent 
having a Guardian and a Conservator to act on his behalf. 
First of all, as set forth in the factual discussion, above, because of the severity of his head 
injury Respondent, has no awareness of how badly he is injured. When he sees a physician, he does 
not give accurate history, does not recount his symptoms completely and is unable to communicate 
effectively with regards to his current treatment. The Guardian, Drew Mayes, indicated in testimony 
that he has had to interject during medical appointments to make sure that the Doctors get an 
accurate history from the Respondent to enable him to prescribe appropriate treatments. See Tr., page 
55-56. Even though the personal care provider, Isabel Hernandez, participates in Respondent's 
health care on a day to day basis, only the Guardian Drew Mayes has statutory authority to intercede 
for the Respondent to act in his best interests at all time pursuant to the probate code under which 
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he was appointed. See Idaho Code§ 15-5-301 et. seq. 
Secondly, as is clear from the factual background set forth above, Respondent requires the 
assistance of a Guardian and Conservator to monitor his day to day living situation to ensure that his 
best interest are, at all times, paramount. Again, while the personal care provider, Isabel Hernandez, 
responsible for the day to day living situation of the Respondent, only the Guardian Drew Mayes and 
Conservator Paul Seidman, have the statutory authority to intercede and act on the Respondent's 
behalf if something he notices in this living situation is inappropriate or poses danger to the 
Respondent. Notably, if Respondent desires to engage in questionable recreation activities which 
exposes him to dangerous situations, only the Guardian Drew Mayes has the statutory authority to 
interceded in order to prevent those activities. 
Thirdly, the Guardian and Conservator are medically necessary for the Respondent to protect 
his interest into the future as well, should Respondents head injury deteriorate and his current living 
situation become unacceptable, the Conservator and the Guardian will be key in making decisions 
and protecting the Respondent so that he has an appropriate living situation which is within his 
medical needs and allows for the safety of both the Respondent and his caregivers. 
Again, although Isabel Hernandez may be instrumental in making this decision, only the 
Conservator and the Guardian are statutorily empowered to act on the Respondent's behalf in 
protecting him in the long run. 
C. The Scope of Idaho Code § 72-432 
Despite the Arguments of Appellants, this is a very broad statute which covers every aspect 
of what it takes to effect a cure and rehabilitation to an injured worker in the State ofldaho. It is not 
limited to medical care alone. 
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First of all, as illustrated by this case, Idaho Code§ 72-432 (3) by specific language, covers 
the services of Isabel Hernandez herein who supplies much more than medical care to the 
Respondent. Ms. Hernandez testified at Hearing that she is a certified family home operator and 
discussed many of the things that she does for the Respondent. Respondent would point out that all 
though Ms. Hernandez is certainly a skilled individual who plays a very important role in this matter, 
very little of what she does can be traditionally termed "medical care." 
Most accurately, Ms. Hernandez is more like a parent to Respondent. She reminds him to get 
up in the morning. She reminds him to get dressed and what clothes are appropriate. She reminds 
him to brush his teeth. She reminds him to bathe and preform other personal hygiene tasks. She 
washes his clothes. She washes his laundry. She changes his bed. She cooks his meals. She turns on 
his television set. She supervises all his past times and accompanies him when he is away from the 
home. 
Ms. Hernandez fills a role in this case which certainly should not be underestimated. 
Respondent contends that because Ms. Hernandez's role in this matter are specifically included in 
Idaho Code § 72-432 (3), it is a fallacy to say that this statue only applies to what we would 
traditionally think of as medical treatment. Ms. Hernandez's care illustrates that the statute should 
be more broadly construed and that many kinds of "attendance" should be recognized as coming 
within this statue. 
Another illustration of the broad scope of Idaho Code § 72-432 is also brought out by the 
facts of this case. The representative of the State Fund, Donna Young, testified that when this case 
first came into the State Fund, a Nurse Case Manager was initially assigned to the case to monitor 
the Respondent's case, keep track of the Respondent's injury, and coordinate his care for the State 
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Fund. Idaho Code § 72-434 and Idaho Code § 72-435 require Respondent to cooperate with such a 
Nurse Case Manager and refusing care or otherwise obstructing what the Nurse Case Manager is 
grounds for penalties under those statutory provisions. Respondent, herein had a duty to cooperate 
with the Nurse Case Manager assigned by the Appellant. 
Respondent would point out that these Nurse Case Managers do not directly offer any 
medical care to an injured Claimant. They do not give shots, they do not administer medications, 
they do not perform x-rays, they do not offer surgeries, they do not perform physical therapies, they 
do not offer any medical care of any kind. However, their services, the coordination of care and the 
arrangement of appointment and coordination between physicians comes under ambit ofldaho Code 
§ 72-432 and Claimant's are obliged to cooperated with these nurses. 
Again, Respondent contends that the very common place activities of these Nurse Case 
Managers, as illustrated by the facts herein, demonstrates that Idaho Code § 72-432 has been 
interpreted broadly and many activities that are not traditionally defined as "medical treatment" are 
governed under the terms of this statue. 
The language of statue itself also supports the Respondent's contention. Subsection (2) of 
Idaho Code § 72-432 addresses an employer's responsibility to furnish replacements and repairs of 
a appliance and prosthesis, including what happens if the appliance or prosthesis is damaged in 
subsequent employment. 
Subparagraph (3), as discussed above, provides for the payment of additional sums as 
determined by the Commission for the constant service of an attendant when it is necessary by reason 
of total blindness, loss of both hands or feet, or by reason of other disability resulting from the injury 
or disease actually rendering an injured worker so helpless as to require constant attendance. This 
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provision also gives the Commission authority to determine the necessity the character and 
sufficiency of any medical service furnished or to be furnished and gives the Industrial Commission 
the authority to order change of physicians, hospital or rehabilitation facilities when in the 
Commission's judgment such change is desirable or necessary. Subsection (3) envisions care which 
is not traditionally medical. This point is amply illustrated in the instant case. 
Paragraph ( 4) of Idaho Code § 72-432 provides for a mechanism of changing physicians if 
an injured worker is dissatisfied with the care which he is being offered. It provides for notice, time 
frames for Hearing, and requires the Industrial Commission to render its decision promptly. Again, 
Respondent would point out that this section of the Code only tangentially involves medical care, 
and is more properly classified as a procedural provision. 
Section (6) of Idaho Code § 72-432 prevents medical providers from engaging in balance 
billing as defined in Idaho Code§ 72-102. Providers are, by this section, restricted to receiving those 
payments which are mandated under the workers' compensation medical reimbursement regulations. 
Again, this provision does not directly address medical benefits but only payment for those benefits. 
Subsection (7) provides that an employee shall not be responsible for charges for medical 
care when he has been referred by his employer expect for personal items or extended services which 
the employee requested for their convenience and are not required for treatment. 
Subparagraph (8) of Idaho Code § 72-432 exempts employers or sureties from any tort 
liability to any health care provider for complying with provisions of the law. 
Subsection (9) of Idaho Code § 72-432 states that no worker who in good faith relies upon 
Christian science treatment should be required to undergo any medical or surgical care that is against 
his religion. 
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Subparagraph ( 10) ofldaho Code§ 72-432 requires the Industrial Commission to enact rules, 
that require physicians and other practitioners providing treatment to make regular reports to the 
Industrial Commission concerning the treatment which they are offering. 
Subparagraph ( 11) ofldaho Code§ 72-432 states that information relevant to or bearing upon 
any occupational injury or disease shall be provided to the employer, surety, attorney of the parties, 
without liability on part of the physician or other providers. This subsection goes on to provide that 
when a physician or hospital willfully fails to make a report the Commission may order forfeiture 
of the payment for these services. This subsection also allows attorneys representing the parties to 
a workers' compensation case to meet with Physicians to discuss the care rendered without the 
presence of the opposing party, thereby exempting workers compensation cases from State and 
Federal privacy laws. 
Subsection (12) of Idaho Code§ 72-432 requires physicians or others providing services to 
assist in the rehabilitation programs provided by the workers' compensation law and, requires 
physicians to inform the Commission as soon as it is apparent that the Employee may be unable to 
return to their job at the time of injury. 
Subsection ( 13) of Idaho Code § 72-432 requires an injured employee to be reimbursed for 
his travel expenses subject to certain limitations. Subsection (14) of Idaho Code § 72-432 is 
procedures for an injured employee who leaves the State to obtain additional medical care in 
cooperation with the Surety and his treating physician. 
As can be seen from this summary of the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-432, this statue is 
very broad and is intended to cover all phases of the process any injured worker has to endure after 
an on the job injury. The statue is broad, it is comprehensive, and it is, Respondent submits, intended 
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to cover all phases of that of which is necessary to bring an injured worker through his or her 
industrial accident. 
D. Idaho Code § 72-432 is intended to cover the expenses of the Guardian and 
the Conservator 
1. Other Attendance - Broadly Construed 
The primary section of the Appellant's Brief in the matter have centered upon interpreting 
the intention of the Legislature in formulating Idaho Code § 72-432, specifically that phrase in 
Section ( 1) of the Statue which reads as follows: 
" ... the Employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable 
medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital services, 
medicines, crutches and apparatus, as made be reasonably required by the 
employee's physician ... " 
Specifically, the Appellant has made several arguments about what the phrase "other 
attendance" means and what the Legislature intended it to mean. 
Respondent contends that the Appellants have omitted the most often cited workers' 
compensation maxim set forth in case law regarding Workers' Compensation Law. Appellants have 
searched high and low for some indication of legislative intent but have forgotten to cite to the long 
line of cases which hold that the workers' compensation law is intended to be broadly construed to 
provide sure and certain relief to injured workers, their families and dependant. 
In the early case of McNeil v. Pan Handle Lumber Co., 34 Idaho 773, 203 P. 1086 (1921), 
the Supreme Court was concerned with the definition of accident and whether or not a worker's 
injury had been incurred as a result of an accident as defined in the Code at the time. Reviewing the 
facts, and the Statue as it existed at the time, the Court held as follows: 
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"Undoubtably, in most cases of accidental injury the Claimant would be able to fix not only 
the day, but the hour, if necessary, when the accident occurred. But any case of this kind in which 
the injury may not appear for sometime after it has been actually inflicted by the accident it would 
be manifestly unfair and a denial of justice to refuse compensation because the Claimant could not 
identify the very day of the accident, although he could fix the time with reasonable certainly. To so 
hold would be to misconstrue that the main provisions of this law, whose purpose is declared by the 
legislature to be to provide sure relief for injured workmen and their families and dependents. The 
Workermans' Compensation Law like other laws of this State, is be liberally construed with a view 
to effect it's object and to promote Justice." (34 Idaho at 786). 
A subsequent case of Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P. 2d 404 (1946), the 
Supreme Court was concerned with an House Mother at the University of Idaho who was injured 
when returning from the grocery store, having obtained supplies for a party to be given to the 
Sorority. Asking the question of whether or not the injury was sustained in the course and scope of 
employment, the Court affirmed the Industrial Commission again citing that the scope of the 
workers' compensation law was intended to be broad by the Legislature. 
" ... all Courts are agreed that there should be accounted to the Workmens' 
Compensation Act a broad and liberal construction, that doubtful cases 
should be resolves in favor of compensation, and that the humane 
purposes which these acts seek to serve leave no room for narrow 
technical construction ... " 
"One of the purposes of the Workmen' Compensation Acts is to broaden 
the right of Employees to compensation for injuries due to their 
employment." (67 Idaho at 26) 
The Court in Smith, above, continued to cite cases from other jurisdiction in support of its 
holding in resolving the case in favor of Ms. Smith. 
Subsequent cases have all reaffirmed this principle and have all indicated that a Legislature 
intended the Workers' Compensation Act to be liberally construed in favor of compensation in 
doubtful cases See Aldridge v. Lamb-Western Inc., 122 Idaho 361,834 P. 2d 878, (1992) Olvera v. 
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Dell's Auto Body 118 Idaho 163, 795 P. 2d 862 (1990) Livingston v. Ireland Bank 128 Idaho 66,910 
P. 2d 738 (1995). 
Respondent contends that this rule of construction and principle of interpretation is directly 
applicable in this case and that the Court herein should construe any language that is in dispute 
liberally in favor of compensation in order to effectuate the broad purposes of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
2. Other Attendance - Not Medical 
The operative language upon which the Industrial Commission relied below comes from that 
part of Idaho Code § 72-432 (1) quoted above and has to do with the meaning of the phrase "other 
attendance." Defendants have broadly argued that because this phrase comes in Idaho Code § 72-432 
it can only apply to medical care. Respondent contends that this argument ignores the plain meaning 
of the Statue and ignores the duty of this Court to liberally construe this statue in favor of 
compensation herein. 
In it's decision, the Industrial Commission cited to various definitions of "attendance" found 
in widely accepted dictionaries in an effort to give this statue its plain and ordinary meaning. The 
Industrial Commission rejected the Appellant's argument that the term attendance in the statue was 
synonymous with medical treatment and found that this interpretation would lead to the conclusion 
that the phrase "other attendance" was mere surplusage and that this is not the manner in which to 
interpret a statute. See Werneke v. St. Mary's Joint School District, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P. 3d 1008 
(2009). 
In further interpreting the language, the Industrial Commission noted that the use of the word 
"attendance" was modified by the word "other." The Industrial Commission found that this meant 
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that the attendance could be supplied was "other" than medical thereby giving the statue a broad 
enough meaning to encompass the relief requested. Respondent contents that this is a correct reading 
of the Statue and that the word "other" means attendance that is other than medical and apart from 
medical. 
Respondent contents that this phrase within Idaho Code § 72-432 recognizes that the 
legislature intended the statue to be broad and to have a catch all phrase which would be interpreted 
to allow compensation for types of care, services, and attendance not specifically mentioned or 
anticipated at the time the statue was written. 
Reference to dictionary definition of "other" support this interpretation. As defined by the 
English Oxford Dictionaries, other is defined as follows: 
" used to refer to a person or thing that is different or distinct from one already mentioned or 
known about;" 
As Defined by Merriam-Webster's most recent dictionary, other is defined as follows; 
"la; being the one (as of two or more) remaining or not included <held on one hand and 
waved with the other> b: being the one or ones distinct from that or those first mentioned or implied 
<taller than the other boys>" 
These definition references all support the idea that the modifier "other" in the text describing 
attendance means that the attendance described is other than medical and apart from medical. To 
interpret the statue in the matter suggested by Defendants would be to ignore the word "other" and 
as noted above, the Industrial Commission indicated that this was contrary to principles of statutory 
construction. 
Respondent contends that the phrase "other attendance" is broad enough taken in conjunction 
with the principles of statutory construction and the manner in which the legislature intended this 
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statute to be read to cover charges of the conservator and the guardian in this case. 
3. Other Attendance - Medical 
If the Court herein believes that the phrase "other attendance" is under the term of the statute, 
medically related, Respondent contents that the services offered by the Conservator and the Guardian 
in this matter should still be found to be compensable. 
As noted in prior sections of this brief, the Guardian in this matter plays a vital role in 
assisting the Respondent with his medical needs. The Guardian is the person who gives the doctors 
the correct history of the Respondent's symptoms. The Guardian is the person who supervises 
medical care offered to the Respondent and is the only person statutorily empowered to make 
judgments about which medical care the Respondent gets and whether or not it is in his best interest. 
The Guardian is the only party in this matter who is statutorily empowered to watch out for 
the Respondent's best interest and guard him from making bad decisions about recreational activities 
and other pursuits which may put him in danger. 
The Respondent contends that this is one of the primary reasons that the Respondent's 
treating physician, Dr. Michael McMartin, declared Respondent's need for a Guardian and 
Conservator to be medically necessary. 
In an associated argument, Respondent contends that the Conservator is also a part of the 
team which cares for the Respondent and makes sure that his medical needs are meet. The 
Conservator negotiates with and pays all of the Respondent's non-related medical costs and will be 
responsible to make sure that Respondent's assets are protected so that if Respondent has non-work 
related medical needs he will have the asserts to obtain those services as the years go by. No other 
actor in this case has the power to negotiate the Physicians, arrange for payment schedules and take 
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care of the Respondent's non-work related medical needs. 
Respondent contends that the Guardian and the Conservator are key players in the team that 
is necessary to make sure that Respondent obtains medical care which is appropriate both from a 
work related stand point and a non related standpoint. If the Supreme Court herein finds that this 
phrase "other attendance" refers to medically related needs, Respondent's request for benefits should 
still be granted. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Respondent contends that the Industrial Commission's decision herein should be Affirmed. 
Respondent contends that the Industrial Commission correctly interpreted the statutory phrase 
contained in Idaho Code § 72-432 (1) as being broad enough to encompass the relief requested. 
Respondent contends that the fees of the Guardian and the Conservator are within the ambit of Idaho 
Code § 72-432 (1) and the ruling of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
DATED this _l]_ day of February, 2017. 
'" 
By: ____ ~ ___ l_~_ 
Richard S. Owen 
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